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Renewables require support policies to deliver the European 20% target. We discuss 
the requirements for least cost development and efficient operation and quantify how 
different schemes (i) allow for the development of a renewable energy technology 
portfolio; (ii) reduce rent transfers to infra-marginal technologies or better than 
marginal resource bases; and (iii) minimise regulatory risk and thus capital costs for 
new projects. 
Long-term take or pay contracts minimise regulatory uncertainty, create appropriate 
incentives for location and operation, allow for efficient system operation and seem 
compatible with European state aid. We discuss how property rights legislation 
protects existing renewables investors, and thus can ensure ongoing investment 
during a transition towards the new scheme.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
The UK target is to produce 15.4% of electricity from renewables by 2015 and 
has expressed an aspiration to source 20% of its electricity from renewable 
generation by 2020 (DTI 2003). If the government also aims to achieve the 
recently announced 30% emission reductions by 2020, a larger share of 
renewables will be required. Further reductions, e.g. towards the 60% 
reduction target by 2050 (DTI 2003) will greatly rely on the mixing of different 
renewable technologies. Yet, experience in the UK and in other European 
countries suggests that the current UK policy instrument for the promotion of 
renewables deployment, the Renewables Obligation (RO),2 struggles to 
deliver on deployment effectiveness, cost-efficiency and technological 
diversity   
 
First, the support is not differentiated for different resource quality and thus 
the RO either pays too much for deployment at very favourable locations or 
too little for deployment at slightly less favourable locations or offshore. In 
theory, the RO scheme could be banded to provide different support levels 
for different technologies or locations. This would create additional flexibility 
for the regulator but make the practical prediction of future ROC prices 
virtually impossible for investors.  
 
Second, investors face significant regulatory risk. (a) It is difficult to anticipate 
the future value of ROCs as this is subject to future policy decisions like the 
renewables target, the eligibility of different technologies and co-firing and 
the possible implementation and subsequent adjustment of banding schemes. 
(b) While renewable technologies are not directly participating in the 
European Emission Trading scheme, the scheme effects the marginal 
generation costs of fossil generation, and new entrant allocation and closure 
conditions can also influence the scarcity value of generation capacity. As the 
ongoing evolution of the scheme is uncertain together with future scarcity 
prices of allowances, it is difficult to anticipate future power prices and thus 
                                                 
2 The Renewables Obligation (RO) came into force in April 2002 and it obliges all licensed 
electricity suppliers in Great Britain to supply a specific proportion of their yearly electricity 
sales from renewable sources. To prove that they have supplied their UK customers with a 
MWh of green electricity suppliers have to present Ofgem with a Renewable Obligation 
Certificate (ROC). If they cant match their requirements with ROCs, suppliers have the choice 
to “buy out” their obligation at 3p/kWh (rising annually with RPI). The funds raised are 




revenue. (c) The UK electricity market design is most likely to evolve to allow 
an efficient operation with increasing penetration of intermittent generation 
and new flow patterns. This will expose individual actors to the cost of 
congestion management, locational losses and will improve the system’s 
response to intraday re-scheduling and balancing demands. Renewable 
technologies are relatively more exposed to these changes. Many renewable 
technologies exhibit low capacity factors such that grid costs are relatively 
more important, and the prediction of wave, solar and wind output is less 
accurate such that they are more exposed to intra-day and balancing costs. 
Consequently, the regulatory risk from changes to the market design is 
significantly higher for renewable technologies than for conventional 
technologies. This makes it difficult for independent project developers to 
finance renewable projects. Thus, the involvement of utilities is required, 
either as counter party for long-term contracts to back independent project 
development or to conduct investment themselves. The risk results in a 
premium on the capital costs, or rate of return, that is required and thus 
increases the costs per turbine by 30% (Butler and Neuhoff 2004, updated 
2007). 
 
In environments with significant regulatory risk the power sector has a long 
tradition of power purchasing agreements (PPA). These are long-term 
contracts between the owner of a power station and the national power sector 
or the respective government. Most of the investment in the UK power 
system after liberalisation was financed on the back of such power purchasing 
agreements between regional electricity suppliers and combined cycle gas 
plants. In the 1990s the non-fossil fuel obligation (NFFO) also offered long-
term contracts to renewable projects. The arrangement was changed, not 
because of the contract structure, but because of the way the contracts were 
allocated.  
 
Therefore we suggest that the UK should revisit the idea of long-term 
contracts for renewable power investment. They need to be evolved in two 
dimensions, as we will discuss in more detail below. First, the contracts need 
to be formulated as take-or-pay contracts. This ensures an efficient dispatch of 
the UK power system without exposing investors to regulatory risk. Second, 
the timing of selling the contracts has to be adjusted. We suggest that the 
government or implementing body (e.g. Ofgem) announces on an annual 
basis a set of take-or-pay contract prices for different technologies and 
resource sites.  Any plant that will be commissioned within 18 months of that 
day can sign such a contract and then operate under the specifications of the 
contract for 20 years.  
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For small-scale projects the volume of contracts that can be signed 
should not be limited. This allows project developers to focus on gaining the 
local support and planning consent, secure in the knowledge that they 
subsequently will be able to sign the take-or-pay contract. If the contracted 
volume is unexpectedly high in one year, then the specific technology can be 
made less attractive in subsequent years by reducing the contract prices 
offered at that time. This allows a smooth targeting of the mid-term 
deployment objectives for different technologies.  
 
For large-scale projects, like an off-shore wind park, the volume of 
contracts that would be signed could be limited and market participants 
would bid in an auction on who is prepared to implement a project at least 
cost. Under the non fossil fuel obligation auctions (NFFO), used to subsidise 
renewables in the UK during the 90s, the “winner’s curse” was a dominant 
feature. Project developers that bid to provide electricity at lowest costs 
frequently noticed that they could not deliver at this price and thus the 
projects were never implemented. Thus we think some obligation to deliver a 
project – probably using some collateral – would be necessary. It will be a 
challenging decision as to how much collateral project developers have to 
post: low posting increases the risk of under-delivery, while high posting 
increases financial risks for project developers and thus overall project costs. 
Such requirements are a feature of many large construction projects, and the 
transaction costs involved can be justified if they are low relative to the 
overall project volume. As only a limited number of participants will propose 
off-shore wind parks, such auction might involve price ceilings to avoid 
exercise of market power (similar to price floors in auctions to access to the 
UK gas network at terminals that are supplied by few producers). The 
transaction costs, uncertainty and collateral involved in such an auction 
restrict the application to large scale projects.  
 
We suggest that the counter-party for all the take-or pay contracts will 
be the grid operator, currently National Grid Transco. The grid operator is in 
the best position to manage the intermittent supply of energy and determine 
when to call different renewable generators to produce electricity, provide 
spinning reserve or remain on standby. The grid-operator would then sell 
energy produced by renewable energy generators in the wholesale electricity 
market. This could involve sales in auctions or bilateral sales where the grid 
operator faces incentive schemes to maximise sales revenue. The remaining 
difference between sales revenue and costs incurred with the take-or pay 
contracts is added to network usage charges, preferably on a per MWh basis. 
Thus, the result for final consumers would be similar to the current support 
scheme of the RO, where supply companies add the additional costs of 
providing renewable energy to customer bills.  
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Take or pay contracts can include differentiated payments according to 
technology or locally available resource base. As these payments are fixed 
with the long-term contracts the differentiation does not create regulatory 
risk. This is in contrast to the current UK debate about banding the renewable 
obligation. If different technologies, or on- and off-shore wind, receive 
different amounts of renewable obligation certificates, then this introduces an 
additional level of flexibility for government to adjust the scheme in the 
future. Any such adjustments will affect the scarcity level of renewable 
obligation certificate – this creates regulatory uncertainty about the future 
revenue today’s renewable investors can expect. 
 
In the energy sector there is a vivid debate about the effect of long-term 
contracts on competitiveness. First, if dominant incumbents sign long-term 
contracts with power generators, and then sell power on their behalf, then this 
increases the market share of these dominant firms, and is thus 
anticompetitive. Second, long-term access contracts to transmission 
infrastructure that were frequently grandfathered to incumbents and are often 
not re-traded or even transparent create an access barrier for new entrants 
and traders. While these two aspects are of little concern in our case, one 
might argue that, third, a market where all output is fully covered on long-
term contracts might not leave room for short-term trading, or opportunity 
for entrants to sell output. This was one of the motivations to move towards a 
system with high levels of spot trading. As investment in power generation 
has received more attention, it became apparent that investors need to cover 
about 70% of their expected output with long-term contracts if they want to 
secure third party financing. This illustrates, that long-term contracts are an 
established means to hedge price risk, also for conventional power 
generation. Long-term contracting and liquid spot markets are not substitutes 
but complements in efficient markets. While long-term contracts remove price 
risk, short-term trading allows participants to adjust positions and to swap 
merit order in response to changes of input prices.  
 
2. Integration of renewables in the power system  
 
An ideal market design for electricity systems would ensure efficient 
decisions on the following three dimensions. First, market participants choose 
the best suitable technology and quantity for investment and closure 
decisions. Second, market participants choose the location in the network that 
minimises the sum of grid expansion costs, system balancing and losses costs, 
resource access costs and environmental impacts. Third, plants are operated 
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such that they provide energy and ancillary services that contribute to the 
least cost operation of the system. 
 
These are rather ambitious objectives, and so most market designs, 
including that of the UK, fudge some of the challenges along all three 
dimensions.  
First, the emissions trading scheme subsidises investment in fossil 
generation with free allocation of CO2 allowances. Institutional barriers, like 
the right for customers to switch suppliers required to facilitate competition, 
undermine the ability for generators to hedge their investment with long-term 
contracts to domestic consumers. This increases the risk premium they have 
to pay on capital and creates a bias against capital-intensive technologies.  
 
Second, during operation market participants are not directly exposed 
to the congestion management costs they impose. Instead, the system 
operator balances the system and socialises these costs; further, grid 
connection costs carry some locational component. This does not address the 
widely varying output patterns of different generation technologies, creates 
additional opportunities to game the system, results in an under-utilisation of 
grid assets, and creates regulatory risk about the possible future evolution of 
grid access arrangements.  
 
Third, the short-term energy market is illiquid, perhaps because large 
generators do not offer all capacity, or at least not at variable cost. As a result, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that British Nuclear retain coal power stations as 
back up as it is worried that the costs of buying backup in the market when a 
nuclear power station goes down could be excessive. If market participants do 
not rely on the market but retain internal reserve and response capabilities, 
then costs to the overall reserve and response costs rise. This creates a bias 
against technologies where individual plants require higher shares of 
responsiveness of the system. The ROC premium also distorts the system, as 
renewable plants only receive the premium when they produce electricity, 
and thus prefer to produce electricity rather than providing spinning reserve 
or shutting down, even if the marginal costs of doing so exceed the value 
provided to the system by up to the value of the ROC premium.  
 
Many of these difficulties arise because the UK electricity design evolved 
without particular attention to intermittent generation or generation with low 
capacity factor. As a result, Ofgem and DTI opted for a system that focuses on 
bilateral trade and fudges many of the engineering realities. As we are 
moving towards a different generation mix, the market design will have to 
evolve so as better to reflect engineering reality in congestion management. If 
the system is to be operated more flexibly with increasing shares of 
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intermittent generation, we also need to find ways that allow thermal power 
stations (fossil, bio-mass and nuclear) to express part-load, minimum down 
time and ramping constraints and thus allow for a system-wide rescheduling 
and optimal balancing. (Both approaches have been successfully implemented 
in all of the US North East.) Finally, there is uncertainty in markets across 
Europe as to whether additional measures will be implemented to support 
investment in new generation capacity or how technology-specific support 
schemes like free CO2 allowance allocation to fossil generation or the RO 
scheme are going to evolve.  
 
Given the widely varying interests of stakeholders that are involved in all 
these aspects, this evolution is likely to take several years. Renewable 
generation technologies will be most affected because, with their low capacity 
factor, they have a higher exposure to grid costs and, with lower 
predictability, they have higher exposure to balancing costs.  
 
It is thus desirable to create a renewable support scheme that insulates 
investors from the regulatory uncertainty that arises from the future evolution 
of grid access, congestion management and balancing. Take-or-pay contracts 
can create this certainty as they ensure that revenue streams will not change 
with changes of market design.  
 
We will now discuss how we can ensure that renewable energy projects that 
sign take-or-pay contracts make an efficient contribution to the operation of 
the power system.   
 
As with most designs, various options can be envisaged. Our straw-man take-
or-pay contract requires the renewable generator to notify the system 
operator or alternative counter-party about the maximum output that can be 
delivered. The system operator, or alternative body, then schedules the 
generator to: (a) remain on stand-by; (b) provide spinning reserve; or (c) 
produce electricity. The take-or-pay contract specifies a basic price pb and 
additional premia that reflect the variable costs of operating in spinning 
reserve ps or produce output po. The renewable generator would thus receive 
the prices pb, pb+ps or pb+po.  
 
The contract could specify whether the system operator, the alternative body, 
or the generator predicts the wind, wave or solar availability. Thus, the 
generator would either notify the technical availability of the plant, or would 
notify the technical and resource availability.  
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This approach ensures that the renewable generator can be integrated 
efficiently into the overall power system, irrespective of the evolution of 
future balancing and congestion management arrangements.  
 
The approach also creates strong incentives for the availability of the power 
station. This is particularly important for new technologies where durability 
and quality is an important part of technology learning. The tariff can 
envisage higher base prices pb during day or winter peaks and thus create 
incentives for generators to schedule maintenance works during other 
periods. 
 
This approach also creates revenue certainty to facilitate investment and is 
thus particularly relevant for non-utility investors that cannot finance the 
investment on their balance sheet, but require bank loans or bonds.  
 
As the take-or-pay contract insulates generators from future policy evolution, 
it also facilitates an evolution of market design to address the needs of a 
flexible system. If generators do not face financial exposure to changes, they 
are less likely to oppose these changes. Ofgem failed to improve the UK 
market design by introducing locational specific loss factors – as generators in 
the North that would receive lower sales revenue for power generated at less 
suitable grid connections challenged any such proposals in court.  
 
3. Technology and locational choices with take-or pay 
contracts 
In principle, one would desire the market to select the least-cost technologies 
for the power sector. However, renewable technologies exhibit two 
characteristics that can justify a differentiated support for different 
technologies and locations.  
 
Some renewable technologies, like for example wave and tidal stream devices, 
have only gained very limited market experience. In contrast, many 
thousands of on-shore wind turbines have been produced and manufacturers 
have learned how to tackle design challenges and reduce production costs. 
Contract prices offered for on-shore wind power would thus not suffice to 
finance renewable energy projects using less ‘experienced’ technologies. To 
develop these less experienced technologies, higher support prices are 
required. This might be justified as it could create the option to use these 
technologies on a larger scale once sufficient experience reduced their cost. It 
would be an imprudent use of public resources if the same high contract 
prices were offered to on-shore wind projects. 
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Take-or-pay contracts can be offered at different price levels to different 
technology groups. The price level can be adjusted, for example on an annual 
basis, for new projects in any one of the technology groups. If the target level 
of deployment in any one of the technology groups is not achieved, then in 
the following year the prices offered can be increased and vice versa. If the 
information that is revealed during the increasing use of a renewable 
technology suggests that this specific technology does not have the potential 
to make a significant contribution to the power supply, then no further 
contracts for this technology group will be offered. All these changes can be 
decided without jeopardising the financing of past investment decisions. 
Thus, investors in renewable projects face little risk and government retains 
the flexibility to evolve future technology policy in response to growing 
learning experience about the different technologies. 
 
If take-or-pay contracts for new renewable projects are to eliminate the 
exposure of investors to risks from changing grid access, connection, 
congestion, losses and balancing designs, then locational signals arising from 
any of these markets or tariffs need to be represented in the contract price 
offered as take-or-pay contracts. To find the optimal solution would require 
rather sophisticated, and thus probably also controversial, modelling of the 
system impacts. However, the currently provided locational signals also fail 
to provide this sophistication. Locational losses and congestion costs are not 
reflected in prices, and the locational differentiated connection charges are 
calculated based on a simple model that calculates long-term system 
extension costs. The strongest locational ‘signal’ that renewable project 
developers currently receive is the waiting period before they will receive a 
grid connection: in Scotland, this can reach more than ten years. Developing 
projects on a first-come-first-served basis implies not only an inefficient 
prioritisation, but also wastes the scarce resources of project developers and 
discourages potential future developers from getting involved in similar 
projects. 
 
This is not to say that locational signals are not important. While a static 
analysis for the best location of a wind turbine might suggest the use of a 
location with the highest wind speed, our simulations for the evolution of the 
UK power system towards high penetrations of wind power suggested 
significant benefits from distributing these across various regions of the UK. 
Not only does this reduce congestion and system expansion costs, but it also 
results in an averaging of the volatile wind output at individual locations. 
Spreading wind turbines across wider areas also implies a more even 
distribution of the visual impact across the UK population. If every citizen is 
exposed to some visual impact from wind turbines in exchange for a climate-
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friendly and secure energy supply, then this might increase levels of public 
acceptance of this form of energy. 
 
Further research and possibly experimentation is required to identify a good 
means of providing locational signals for renewable energy projects. This 
result applies equally to approaches like the RO, the banded RO, the feed-in 
tariff or take-or-pay contracts. Two of the options available for take-or-pay 
contracts are: first, to offer locationally differentiated contract prices to direct 
investment towards the preferred regions; or second, to use grid connection 
delays as a means to distribute projects. The second approach has, as 
discussed above, the disadvantage of an inefficient selection process and 
therefore pays on average higher prices. 
 
If, as sometimes discussed, government were to target certain levels of 
renewable contribution for different regions – e.g. to address planning aspects 
– then this could also be reflected in the tariff structure. In this context, the 






A change from the current support scheme (RO) towards take-or-pay 
contracts needs to be carefully designed. Revenues of past and ongoing 
investments have to be sufficient to ensure investors’ confidence in 
government policy and to secure the continuation of ongoing investment until 
the new scheme has passed all political hurdles and is legally binding. 
Investors’ confidence has been increased by the UK’s relatively recent 
incorporation in national law (under the Human Rights Act 1998) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. This guarantees that investors 
cannot have their property expropriated by a simple change of the legal 
framework and thus requires the government to give careful consideration to 
how to secure investors’ confidence by showing sufficient respect for their 
acquired property rights. The possible constraints imposed by these legal 
provisions will be discussed once the basic transitional proposal has been 
outlined. 
 
Lets assume the new scheme involving take-or-pay contracts will be 
implemented from 1 January 2008. Any new renewable projects that desire 
public support will be covered by take-or-pay contracts. Existing projects will 
continue to produce ROCs. Rather than requiring electricity supply 
companies to submit ROCs corresponding to a pre-specified volume of their 
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electricity sales, we would envisage that all ROCs would be redeemed at a 
fixed price.  
 
The price at which these ROCs will be redeemed in the future has to be high 
enough such that ongoing renewable energy projects will be pursued and 
commissioned during the transition period. As it is currently mainly on-shore 
wind projects that are newly commissioned, this does not pose a major 
hurdle. It seems that they are highly beneficial under the current scheme, and 
technology and locational specific take-or-pay contracts are likely to reduce 
their revenue.  
 
The price at which ROCs have to be redeemed in the future also has to be 
high enough so as to create investor confidence in the technology policy of the 
UK government. Significant doubts as to the credibility of this policy would 
undermine future attempts to accelerate low-Carbon technology in the UK, 
and thus would be rather counter-productive for the wider objective of 
decarbonising the UK economy. In Section 5, we will discuss what level of 
compensation would derive from: first, the currently signed longer-term 
contracts for ROCs and energy from renewable energy projects; second, the 
costs of wind turbine projects; and, third, the projected deployment of 
renewable energy projects and the implied ROC price.  
 
While it might legally be possible to transfer all existing projects to take-or-
pay contracts, this could involve high transaction and renegotiation costs. 
However, one could offer renewable energy projects the option to decide in 
the year 2008 as to whether they want to sign a take-or-pay contract under the 
conditions prevalent in 2008 and for a period corresponding to 20 years minus 
the age of the project.  
 
Thus, we will continue to need an institution that redeems the ROCs. As we 
have already identified the system operator as an appropriate counter-party 
for long-term take-or pay contracts, he would also be well positioned to 
redeem the ROCs. The remaining long-term contracts from renewables 
support mechanisms during the 1990s under the NFFO could also be 
transferred to the system operator, thus bundling all the contracts with one 
counter-party. 
 
4.2 Legal issues 
 
With an idea of the framework of the transitional regime in mind, we can 
move to assess the legal position that would apply to this transitional 
proposal. The three key elements in this assessment are: first, the combined 
application of fundamental rights law and EC free trade law; second, the 
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significance of national fundamental rights law under the Human Rights Act 
1998 (‘HRA 1998’); and, third, the requirements of EC State aid law. 
 
4.2.1 Fundamental rights and the free movement of goods 
 
It is clear from the case law3 of the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) that 
measures such as the current RO and the proposed take-or-pay regime 
amount, prima facie, to a restriction imposed by a Member State upon the free 
movement of goods (here, electricity). Insofar as such measures favour 
domestically generated electricity and require a percentage of electricity 
requirements to be sourced therefrom, they are such as to hinder the 
importation of renewable power from other Member States. In those 
circumstances, for such a national measure to be compatible with the EC 
Treaty, some derogation or justification for the measure must be shown. This 
justification must be compatible with EC law, both with regard to its purpose 
and proportionality and with regard to the need to respect fundamental rights 
(which are themselves a part of the EC legal order).4 In the case law of the 
ECJ, the provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’) has come to occupy a place of 
particular significance:5 for our purposes, we can assume that the relevant 
provisions of the ECHR would form the yardstick for testing national 
measures for compliance with EC fundamental rights standards. 
 
Here, the claimed justification would naturally be one of environmental 
protection, in that the transitional maintenance in force of the RO system 
(with the option to transfer into the take-or-pay contract system) still seeks to 
encourage investment in the provision of environmentally sustainable 
electricity generation.  
 
Meanwhile, the relevant fundamental rights consideration concerns the right 
to property, enshrined in Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. The 
relevant case law concerning the application of this provision is discussed in 
some detail in the Annex attached to this paper (see Annex I). Essentially, any 
national measure that sought to expropriate property (under which heading 
the ROC would fall), to control its use or to disturb the peaceful enjoyment of 
                                                 
3 See, for the clearest illustration, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG [2001] 
ECR I-2099, paras. 69-71. 
4 See Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellsschaft [1970] ECR 1125, which established the rule 
that the EC legal order required general respect for fundmanetal rights. It was later made 
clear that this fundamental rights regime also applies to the actions of the Member States 
when they seek to derogate from EC law: see Case 260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925. 
5 See, e.g., Case 4/73 Nold Kohlen- und Baustoffgroβhandlung v. Commission [1974] ECR 491 and 
Case 44/79 Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, para. 15. 
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possessions would prima facie amount to a breach of Article 1 of the First 
Protocol. Any such breach would require justification on a recognised public 
interest ground and the interference with property rights would have to be 
proportionate to that justifying ground. Thus, both under EC free trade law 
and EC fundamental rights law (as ‘borrowed’ from the ECHR), there is a 
question of the proportionality of the transitional regime. 
 
With regard to restrictions upon trade, it might be argued that the RO system 
would no longer be proportionate to the objective to be achieved, given the 
arguments deployed in this paper in favour of adopting the take-or-pay 
contract system as a more effective system. We would suggest, however, that 
the transitional nature of the scheme, coupled with the significant leeway 
granted to Member States in such circumstances of regulatory and 
technological experimentation and development, and allied with the 
fundamental rights considerations treated above, all militate in favour of the 
conclusion that the transitional scheme proposed here would satisfy the 
proportionality test required here, provided that the price set was neither 
excessively high nor unjustifiably low. 
 
Thus, the key question will be whether or not the price set for the redemption 
of the ROCs is sufficiently high to satisfy the requirements of proportionality: 
i.e., the price must not be a disproportionate control of the property rights in 
ROCs already held or expected to be generated by normal plant operation. On 
the other hand, the level of support provided beyond the competitive price by 
the price received by ROC-holders must not amount to a disproportionate 
restriction upon the free movement of goods (here, imported electricity): i.e. 
the ROC redemption price cannot be too high either. The result of this 
analysis will be to provide a relatively broad band of prices that will be 
sufficiently proportionate in both ‘directions’ to satisfy both EC trade law and 
fundamental rights law. In section 5 we will present observed long-term 
contract prices as an upper end for this range and the costs for wind projects, 
as calculated by the International Energy Agency, as a lower end for this 
range. 
 
4.2.2 Fundamental rights under UK law – the Human Rights Act 1998 
 
As a result of the discussion in the previous paragraphs, it will be clear that 
the requirements of EC law with regard to fundamental rights will be 
appropriate to cover the key issues raised with regard to the right to property. 
However, it should be noted that it might be of significance in certain 
circumstances that there is also national law protection for fundamental rights 
in the UK, by virtue of the adoption of the HRA 1998. 
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In the UK, the RO has its legal basis in the various Renewables Obligation 
Orders (most recently, S.I. No. 1004 of 2006).6 This is not a piece of primary 
legislation within the meaning of the HRA and thus means that the Secretary 
of State is required to respect the provisions of the ECHR, as incorporated into 
UK law by the HRA 1998, when adopting such secondary measures. Any 
inconsistency would lead to the relevant Order being void for breach of 
fundamental rights law. Of course, such inconsistency would have to be 
established by the application of the same basic test discussed above, 
including proportionality. 
 
Furthermore, as discussed in Annex I, much of the Strasbourg Court’s case 
law under the ECHR has been relatively permissive in its attitude towards 
State control of the use of property, but it has done so by regular invocation of 
the so-called ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine. It should be noted that, within 
that margin, it remains open to national courts to take a stricter view of the 
requirements of proportionality when assessing the compatibility of national 
measures that are restrictive of property rights and their use. Thus, it is 
possible that under either the EC provisions (discussed above) or under the 
UK provisions (under the HRA 1998) a national court might scrutinise more 
closely the level of compensation provided under the transitional scheme 
with regard to the ongoing generation of ROCs. The likely result of this 
approach would be to shift the price upwards within the band established as 
appropriate by the analysis under 4.2.1, above: any greater increase would fall 
foul of the supreme and direct effect of EC law as a disproportionate barrier 
to the free movement of goods.7
 
4.2.3 EC State aid law 
 
It is possible that it might be alleged that the guarantee of a return on ROCs 
during the transitional period could be seen as a State subsidy that favours 
renewable generators over those competitors whose generation activities do 
not receive ROCs. This issue is covered more fully in the next section with 
                                                 
6 See http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2006/20061004.htm#note1. 
7 This would be so unless national fundamental rights law would claim that greater protection 
would be required for the property right, to the extent that the barrier to trade would be 
rendered disproportionate. On the basis of practice in the UK to date, this seems highly 
unlikely – however, it is a point of interest for any other systems where the range of 
Constitutional provisions that might protect such commercial property interests is wider, and 
where the extent of that Constitutional protection is greater. (Indeed, this raises the 
interesting and potentially damaging spectre of national constitutional law conflicting with 
EC law requirements – the EC law position on such conflicts is that EC law prevails, but 
national Constitutional courts might take a different view, if such national courts decide that 
the ECJ and the EC are systemically failing to protect fundamental rights to the extent that the 
national system would require.) 
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regard to the proposed new scheme, and the structure of the analysis is 
essentially the same: in short, it may be wise to notify the scheme under the 
EC State aid rules for safety’s sake, although it seems highly unlikely that the 
transitional regime would amount to aid at all. 
 
It is thus to the legal assessment of the proposed new system of take-or-pay 
contracts for the promotion of renewable electricity that the analysis must 
now turn. 
5. Legal issues relating to the proposed new scheme 
 
The proposed new approach to encourage renewable electricity generation in 
the UK must also clear a number of legal hurdles if it is to be a robust scheme 
going forward. 
 
The new system will arguably meet objections similar to those raised above 
with regard to the free movement of goods: again, it is highly likely that its 
contours will satisfy the requirements to justify any restriction upon such free 
movement. The case of PreussenElektra,8 which is directly relevant given its 
fact scenario (a power feed-in law with supported prices for renewable 
generation), would seem clearly to allow such a national system on 
environmental grounds, even where it seeks to favour domestic production 
through a supported price and take-or-pay obligation. 
 
For our purposes, therefore, the potentially trickier issues relate to 
competition law, broadly conceived: specifically, both EC State aid law and 
the antitrust provisions of the EC Treaty and UK law. Each of these will be 
examined in turn. 
 
5.1 EC State aid law 
 
The scheme of the EC Treaty assumes that aid granted by a Member State is 
prohibited unless some exception or exemption is provided for in or under 
the Treaty.9 The general prohibition against such aid is laid down in Article 
87(1) EC: 
 
                                                 
8 See footnote 2, above. 
9 In the EC Treaty itself, there are both automatic and discretionary exceptions from the 
prohibition, although both require Commission approval after notification of the aid by the 
Member State. Under the Treaty, legislation has been adopted to exempt various aids from 
the prohibition, in the style of the Block Exemptions used to give effect to the exemption in 
Article 81(3) EC. (See Joined Cases T-447/93 and T-448/93 AITEC v. Commission [1995] ECR II-
1971.) 
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Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a member State 
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States, be incompatible with the common market. 
 
From this provision, and from the case law and decisional practice of the 
Commission, certain criteria must be met to show that something amounts to 
‘State aid’ for these purposes. It must be established that: 
 
• an ‘advantage’ has been conferred10
 
• which was granted by the State or through State resources11
 
• which distorts or threatens to distort competition12
 
• by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
or services (i.e. a ‘selectivity’ criterion)13
 
• and which affects or may affect trade between EC Member States.14
 
Under our proposed system, it would not be difficult to show the conferral of 
an advantage, the distortion of competition (between electricity generators) 
through selective benefit and an effect upon inter-Member State trade. 
However, the question of whether or not the advantage was granted by the 
State or through State resources is more difficult. 
 
5.1.1 ‘State resources’ 
 
                                                 
10 Case C-256/97 Déménagements-Manutention Transport SA (DMT) [1999] ECR I-3913: has ‘the 
recipient undertaking receive[d] an economic advantage which would not have obtained 
under normal market conditions’? 
11 See, e.g., Joined Cases 67, 69 and 70/85 Kwekerij Gebroeders Van der Kooy BV v. Commission 
[1988] ECR 219. 
12 See, e.g., Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v. Commission [1980] ECR 2671 and Cases 296 
and 381/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek v. Commission [1985] ECR 809. 
13 Favourable treatment granted to a given sector within the scope of general taxation will 
normally be regarded as an aid (Case 70/72 Commission v. Germany [1973] ECR 813) but may 
also be sometimes objectively justified as a response to market forces (Case 67/85 Van der Kooy 
[1988] ECR 219, although that justification was not established in the case itself). 
14 See, e.g., Case 102/87 France v. Commission (Brewery loan) [1988] ECR 4067. This criterion is 
generally very easily found to be satisfied – indeed, such an effect is often assumed if the 
other criteria are met. 
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Because the proposed system provides a supported price to renewable power 
generators, which could be said to be in competition with generators of 
electricity which do not receive such price support. Again, the situation and 
analysis in PreussenElektra case are highly relevant to our proposed scheme. In 
that case, the cost of supporting the subsidy for renewable power generation 
was borne by the distribution and/or transmission system operators, which in 
turn passed these costs on to final consumers in their access (etc) pricing. The 
ECJ held, contrary to the submissions of the Commission, that this meant that 
any resources transferred to the renewable electricity producers ultimately 
came from consumers and, crucially,  not from State resources, nor directly by 
the State. Thus, those transfers did not amount to illegal State aid under EC 
law.15 Similarly, under our proposed system, the TSO will be the counter-
party under the take-or-pay contract and thus will be required to pay the 
supported price and then to incorporate that cost into the prices that it 
charges for network access. This means that the final subsidy would be paid 
by consumers and would not come from State resources. Therefore, on the 
authority of PreussenElektra, this does not amount to State aid under EC law 
and should not, strictly, require notification for clearance by the Commission. 
 
5.1.2 Notification and justification 
 
It should be noted that alternative support systems where funds come more 
directly from the State may well raise such State aid concerns and would then 
require notification to the Commission and thus the pleading of a justification 
for the grant of any such aid.16 Note, further, that all indications are that the 
Commission remains unhappy with the ECJ’s judgment in PreussenElektra on 
the State aid issue and may seek to argue again that, since the only reason that 
consumers must pay is because the State exercises its legislative/regulatory 
authority to create a system that forces the consumer to pay, this is basically 
the use of the State’s power to make someone else pay the costs on the State’s 
behalf. (I.e. it is to all intents and purposes granted ‘by the State’, even if it 
amounts to the State requiring someone else actually to pay.) If there were 
                                                 
15 We should point out that, alongside the alternative analysis presented by the Commission 
in the case, the ECJ’s judgment in PreussenElektra has been subjected to criticism by a number 
of commentators, on the ground that the ECJ took far too narrow an approach to the 
interpretation of the notion of the benefit being conferred from ‘State resources’. See, e.g., 
Bronckers and van der Vlies (2001), esp. 460-465 for strong criticism, and Baquero Cruz and 
Castillo de la Torre (2001), esp. 490-494 for a balanced but somewhat critical discussion. 
16 See, most recently, the Commission’s Decision to accept the feed-in tariff to support green 
electricity in Austria (N317a/2006, 7 July 2006, accepted without objections: [2006] OJ C221/8). 
This Decision has been discussed in more detail by Renner-Loquenz: ‘State aid in feed-in 
tariffs for green electricity’ EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 3 – Autumn 
(2006), 61-65. 
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any change in the ECJ’s case law, then it is clear that such a system as that 
proposed would require notification and justification on environmental 
grounds, and the aid could only go so far as was proportionate to the 
environmental goals to be achieved (see Johnston (2006) and the references 
cited therein, for discussion of this point). 
 
This point may not, if the ECJ’s stance in PreussenElektra survives, be of great 
significance to our proposed scheme, but it is of relevance to any Member 
State intending to adopt a promotion scheme involving the State as the 
counter-party: such schemes are likely to require notification and justification 
under the State aid rules. It may also be prudent to notify our proposed 
scheme to the Commission, if only to reassure market participants that no 
nasty surprises might be sprung upon them by disgruntled competitors 
further down the line: the EC State aid rules are directly effective and may 
entitle private parties to seek to require a Member State to recover any 
unlawfully paid aid from its recipient, so this uncertainty is an investment 
risk worth removing if at all possible. 
 
To the extent that the purpose of the subsidy is to achieve the environmental 
objective, it seems highly likely that the Commission would conclude that the 
subsidy is proportionate to achieving that objective (see, again, Johnston 
(2006) and the references cited therein).17 The EC’s Renewables Directive 
(Commission 2001) (2001/77/EC, [2001] OJ L283/33) provides the policy 
context within which any proposed aid to be granted in this area must be 
assessed: while its targets for Member States are indicative, it is likely that the 
Commission’s Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection 
(Commission 2001a) ([2001] OJ C37/3) will, in combination with the goals of 
the Renewables Directive, see the Commission’s discretion to grant an 
exemption exercised in favour of a scheme such as that which we propose. 
Indeed, para. 32 of the Guidelines suggests that investment to promote 
sources of renewable energy may receive at least 40% of eligible costs in aid 
(rising to 100% in cases ‘where it can be shown to be necessary’). Given that 
the scheme proposed here does not extend to such levels of support, it seems 
safe to assume that a notified scheme would not have great difficulty in 
passing the State aids check with a clean bill of health, provided that the 
notification were properly presented and justified. 
 
                                                 
17 This would, it seems, also be true if part of the environmental objective were to advance 
renewable energy generation technology: true, it might require a separate argument to be 
pursued regarding research & development aid generally, or within the environmental field, 
but there seems no reason why the result should not be the same. Again, if our analysis is 
correct – that there is in fact no State aid, on the basis of the PreussenElektra case – then the 
goals sought by the system do not need justification on State aid grounds in any case. 
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Thus, we conclude that State aid notification to the EC Commission of our 
proposed scheme would probably be desirable to ensure maximum security 
for investors, although we do not anticipate that the scheme does in fact 
create difficulties under EC State aid law. 
 
 
5.2 Antitrust law 
 
5.2.1 Restrictions upon a Member State’s activities 
 
It could be argued that the State’s adoption of a system requiring entry into 
long-term take-or-pay contracts at a price not determined by the market 
restricts competition among renewable power generators. Under EC law, the 
norm of Articles 3(g), 10 and 81 EC requires that EC Member States must not 
act so as to undermine the system under the EC Treaty that seeks to ensure 
that competition is not distorted within the common market.18 It seems clear 
here that the EC law principle would be engaged, given the potential cross-
border trade in renewable electricity. However, the specific application of this 
norm by the ECJ has, thus far, not extended to the control of such price 
regulatory activities. Instead, the ECJ has limited the case law to three specific 
situations: (i) the imposition of cartels; (ii) the encouragement of collusive 
practices or the reinforcement of their effects; and (iii) the delegation of rule-
making competences by the State to private entities (Slot & Johnston (2006), 
para. 7.3 and the references cited therein)). None of these applies to the 
situation under our proposed scheme. Thus, it seems that enshrining this 
system in legislative or regulatory State measures should not, per se, prove 
problematic. 
 
Note, however, that it is then required that companies operating under such a 
(price) regulated system must still compete so far as they are able.19 This is 
clearly a key feature of the incentive system proposed here, as it intends to 
encourage investment in renewable power generation and leaves scope for 
competition on technological development, innovation and efficiency savings, 
and so on. Indeed, the primary market in this context is, in many respects, 
that for Photovoltaic panels, wind turbines and other renewable technologies: 
                                                 
18 Similarly, Article 86 EC makes clear that where an undertaking is of a public character 
and/or has been charged with the performance of special tasks (or have been granted 
exclusive or special rights in a particular field) then there is prima facie a duty upon the State 
to ensure that their operation does not distort competition (or, indeed, infringe other EC 
Treaty rules). At the same time, Article 86 EC provides for a possible derogation from the 
application of the EC competition rules insofar as the performance of those tasks so requires. 
For discussion, see Slot and Johnston (2006), 256-271. 
19 See Cases 240-242, 261, 262, 268 and 269/82 Stichting SSI v. Commission [1985] ECR 3860. 
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that market remains very much open to international competition under the 
proposed scheme (and current evidence suggests strong and growing 
competition in this field). Further, the secondary market for project 
developers to establish installations in the UK also remains open to 
international investment and competition. 
 
5.2.2 Behaviour of undertakings under the scheme and under antitrust law 
 
Requiring the conclusion of long-term contracts between renewable power 
generators and the TSO may create potential problems with the rules on 
vertical restraints of competition under EC and/or UK competition law, due in 
particular to the duration of the purchasing obligations under those contracts. 
While these area designed to ensure investment security, so as to encourage 
the development of an increased number of renewable electricity generating 
facilities, the long-term nature of the contractual arrangement has been found 
to foreclose possible market entry (here, this would be most likeliest to come 
from imports into the UK from other Member States). 
 
The applicability of Article 81(1) EC or Chapter I prohibition under s. 2 of the 
Competition Act 1998 (‘CA 1998’) depends upon the existence of: 
 
• an agreement or concerted practice; 
 
• which has as its object or effect the restriction or distortion of 
competition within the EC (for Article 81 EC) or the UK (for the 
Chapter I prohibition) and 
 
• which has an effect upon trade between Member States (for Article 81 
EC) or in the UK (for the Chapter I prohibition). 
 
Once a given agreement or practice is caught by Article 81(1) EC/s. 2(1) CA 
1998, then the infringing provisions will be rendered void by Article 81(2) 
EC/s. 2(1) CA 1998, unless they can be exempted, either under a relevant EC 
block exemption regulation or individually by the application of the criteria 
under Article 81(3) EC or s. 9 CA 1998. Here, the relevant EC block exemption 
is laid down in Regulation 2790/1999/EC ([1999] OJ L336/21) on the 
application of Article 81(3) EC to categories of vertical agreements and 
concerted practices. 
 
The substantive rules under EC and UK regimes on these points are 
effectively identical, as the UK uses the EC vertical agreements block 
exemption Regulation as a parallel exemption under national law as well 
(discussed in Slot and Johnston (2006), Ch. 3). The criterion that determines 
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which of the two applies is whether or not there is merely likely to be an effect 
on trade within the UK (in which case only UK competition law applies) or 
whether there is also likely to be an effect upon trade between EC Member 
States (when EC competition law would be activated). Here, however, given 
the potential for cross-border trade (in the form of the importation of 
electricity generated from renewable sources), it seems likely that as a formal 
matter it will be the EC competition rules that apply. 
 
A number of key preliminary questions must be answered to establish the 
applicability of competition law to the scheme proposed here, although most 
are prima facie straightforward to address.20 One more problematic issue is the 
establishment of the relevant market(s) for the purposes of assessing whether 
or not any restriction of competition can be said to exist. This is particularly 
difficult when proposing a new scheme that is intended to have an impact 
upon those very market structures. It will be assumed here that, as a result of 
the scheme, a separate and very specific market will come into being for the 
supply of electricity generated from renewable sources to the TSO (and not 
for the supply of renewable power downstream). This market is open to 
everyone to enter, subject to spatial planning requirements and at the 
regulated price. 
 
Assuming that there is this specific market for the supply of renewable 
electricity to the TSO, then it seems that our proposed system does raise 
competition concerns, since its requirement that the TSO purchase or pay for 
such generation under the take-or-pay contract has the result of restricting 
access to the UK market for such electricity to non-UK-based renewable 
generators or suppliers, in that those latter suppliers will not be able to sell to 
the TSO at all (or at least not on the same price-supported terms). Prima facie, 
this has the potential to restrict competition and thus requires exemption or 
justification if it is not to be held void under the competition rules. 
 
The question thus arises: how can we deal with this issue under EC and/or 
UK law? Three particular approaches appear particularly significant here: 
first, it may be argued that competition law actually does not apply to the 
situation under our proposed scheme; second, it may be argued that the block 
exemption Regulation for vertical agreements may apply so as to address any 
competition concerns; and, third, it is possible to argue that an individual 
                                                 
20 E.g. those involved must be ‘undertakings’ under Article 81(1) EC/s. 2(1) CA 1998: clearly, 
the parties here will be engaged in an economic activity and will thus satisfy this test. Further, 
some ‘agreement’ must be shown – again, the contract required under our proposed scheme 
would satisfy this requirement (although see the discussion under section 5.2.2(i), below, on 
how to characterise that agreement). 
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exemption from the competition rules may be available under Article 81(3) EC 
to deal with any competition concerns that may arise. We will now examine 
each of these approaches in more detail. 
 
5.2.2(i) Competition law does not actually apply at all 
 
One possible argument to deploy against the applicability of the antitrust 
rules on vertical agreements in this context is that the regulatory regime 
proposed would be adopted by State action and thus leaves no room for any 
genuine exercise of independent will on the part of renewable electricity 
generators and, in particular, the TSO. In such circumstances, the conclusion 
of the contract is de facto mandated by the regulatory regime chosen by the 
State and thus cannot be ascribed to a voluntary agreement on the part of the 
generator and the TSO. Thus, the analysis from the preceding paragraphs on 
the State’s freedom to choose regulatory goals and design systems would 
apply, so as to exempt the agreements thus concluded from scrutiny under 
the competition rules (subject to the caveat, also discussed above, that 
competition must continue where it is possible under that system). 
 
Although it is true to say that no investor is forced to spend its money by 
developing renewable energy projects, it must also be conceded that the 
practical operation of the take-or-pay contract scheme proposed here is 
functionally identical to a scheme in which the State requires as a matter of law 
that the TSO must take all renewable electricity generated by the producer in 
its area and at a supported price determined each year by the regulatory 
authorities. If that would count as a legitimate State regulatory choice, then 
there is clearly a strong argument that, as a matter of substance, the scheme 
proposed here should be treated in a functionally similar manner and thus the 
contracts should not be subjected to scrutiny and the need to be justified 
under EC and/or UK competition law. 
 
However, it is possible that this argument would not find favour with the 
courts or the national or EC competition authorities, were the point to be 
raised before them, so it is necessary also to consider whether or not a 
justification for the contract duration may be sought within competition law. 
 
5.2.2(ii) Application of the EC block exemption Regulation on Vertical 
Agreements 
 
A second approach would be to rely upon the block exemption Regulation for 
vertical agreements (Regulation 2790/1999/EC) to exempt these take-or-pay 
contracts from EC and/or national competition law. However, the duration of 
these contracts exceeds the normal maximum permitted by the Regulation 
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(specifically Article 5(a) on non-compete obligations)21 of 5 years. As a result, 
such clauses would not be exempted by the Regulation from the prohibition 
of Article 81 EC and would thus require individual justification under Article 
81(3) EC (or the analogous provisions of s. 9 CA 1998 under UK law). 
 
5.2.2(iii) Application of the Article 81(3) EC/s. 9 CA 1998 exemption 
 
Thus, if the block exemption Regulation cannot apply so as to exempt the 
contracts under the proposed scheme from the prohibition of Article 81 
EC/Ch. I CA 1998, then the final possibility is to fall back upon the now 
directly effective provisions of Article 81(3) EC, which can be invoked before 
a national court or national competition authority (in the UK, the OFT) 
against any argument that the relevant contract is anti-competitive (after 
Regulation 1/2003/EC [2003] OJ L1/1). The basic criteria which must be 
satisfied under Article 81(3) EC (which are identical to those under s. 9 CA 
1998) are as follows:22
 
Condition I: the arrangement must contribute to the improvement of 
production or distribution or to the promotion of technical or economic 
progress; 
 
Condition II: a fair share of the resulting benefit must be enjoyed by 
consumers; 
 
Condition III: the arrangement must not impose any restrictions upon 
the undertakings concerned that are not indispensable to the 
achievement of these goals; 
 
Condition IV: the arrangement must not give the undertakings 
concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the goods or services in question. 
                                                 
21 A ‘non-compete obligation’ is defined in Article 1(b) of the Regulation as ‘any direct or 
indirect obligation causing the buyer not to manufacture, purchase, sell or resell goods or 
services which compete with the contract goods or services, or any direct or indirect 
obligation on the buyer to purchase from the supplier or from another undertaking 
designated by the supplier more than 80% of the buyer's total purchases of the contract goods 
or services and their substitutes on the relevant market, calculated on the basis of the value of 
its purchases in the preceding calendar year’. This would clearly seem to cover the situation 
under our envisaged take-or-pay contract scheme, in that it may cause the purchaser (the 
TSO) not to purchase competing goods (electricity generated from renewable sources) from 
suppliers in other Member States. 
22 For discussion, see Commission Notice, ‘Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty’ [2004] OJ C101/97, Whish (2003), Chs. 4 and 16 (esp. pp. 641-642), and Slot & 
Johnston (2006), Ch. 3 (esp. para. 3.5). 
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It seems tolerably clear that conditions I, III and IV are comfortably satisfied 
by our proposed take-or-pay contract scheme: 
 
• as discussed in the preceding legal analysis, the key focus is the goals 
in condition I (environmentally sustainable electricity generation, 
while encouraging technological innovation in the field); 
 
• the proportionality analysis employed above (when examining the free 
trade rules) seems equally apposite here to satisfy the requirements of 
condition III as to indispensability (particularly when the results of the 
RO scheme to date – in achieving an increasing share of the market for 
renewable electricity generation – are examined); and 
 
• the points made (in section 5.2.1, above) concerning the competition 
that remains in the relevant markets dispose nicely of condition IV. 
 
However, condition II (concerning consumer benefit) may cause somewhat 
greater difficulty. It should be noted at the outset that in its exemption 
decisions under Article 81(3) EC the Commission has rarely devoted extensive 
analysis to the question of consumer benefit, provided that the other three 
conditions have been met by the arrangement in issue (although there are 
indications of more rigorous treatment in recent years).23 The recently issued 
Commission Notice on the application of Article 81(3) EC provides greater 
detail on how to show consumer benefit when seeking to justify a particular 
arrangement. In summary, the Commission’s approach is to establish the 
extent of pass-on to consumers of any efficiency gains that result from the 
arrangement: such efficiency gains cover both cost efficiencies and ‘qualitative 
efficiencies’ (which include new or improved products). Any attempt to 
assess the likely outcome of our proposed scheme with regard to these criteria 
is of necessity somewhat speculative, but a few general observations may be 
made here: 
 
• the notion of ‘consumer’ is a broad one, which includes ‘all direct or 
indirect users of products covered by the agreement’ (Commission 
Notice, para. 84) – this includes wholesalers, retailers and final 
consumers; 
 
• what must be transferred is a ‘fair share’ of the resulting benefits, not 
all benefits – this formulation clearly provides some margin of 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Albors-Llorens (2006), esp. pp. 266-269 and the references cited therein. 
 24
appreciation for the competition authorities and national courts in 
assessing how much is ‘fair’ in the relevant context; 
 
• the greater the intensity of competition in the relevant market, the 
likelier it will be that any benefits generated by the arrangement will be 
transferred to the consumer; 
 
• collective environmental benefits to society generally were considered 
by the Commission in its CECED Decision to be relevant to the 
assessment of consumer benefits under Article 81(3) EC.24 In particular, 
the benefits to be gained from the rectification of environmental 
damage at source (a principle specifically laid down in Article 174 EC) 
were quantified and found to be more than seven times higher than the 
increased purchase costs to consumers (here, of the more energy 
efficient washing machines that would result from the agreement). The 
Commission explicitly ruled that: ‘such environmental results for 
society would adequately allow consumers a fair share of the benefits 
even if no benefits accrued to individual purchasers of machines’. 
Clearly, such considerations are also of great relevance to the 
justification of our proposed scheme; 
 
• we should also note the acceptance by the Commission of long-term 
contracts in earlier energy cases where there was a clear need to secure 
infrastructure investment:25 in both Decisions, a 15-year exclusive off-
take clause in long-term power purchase agreements was found to 
meet the requirements of Article 81(3) EC. This is reinforced by a 
judgment of the Court of First Instance26 (‘CFI’) on the question of 
long-term contracts for rail services. In this judgment, the CFI held (in 
annulling a Commission Decision that attempted to limit a rail services 
agreement to a duration of 8 years) that ‘the length of time required to 
ensure a proper return on … investment is necessarily a factor to be 
taken into account when determining the duration of an exemption’. 
This implies that the considerations of investment security and return 
that are major motivating factors behind the design of our proposed 
                                                 
24 Commission Decision 2000/475/EC, CECED (Case IV.F.1/36.718) [2000] OJ L187/47 
(available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2000/l_187/l_18720000726en00470054.pdf), paras. 55-57. 
25 See, e.g., the cases considered by the Commission, such as Pêgo [1993] OJ C265/3 and the 
Decision in Scottish Nuclear (Decision 91/329/EEC, Case IV./33.473) [1991] OJ L178/31: both of 
these Decisions concerned long-term power purchase agreements, in Portugal and Scotland 
respectively. 
26 Joined Cases T-374, 375, 384 and 388/94 European Night Services v. Commission [1998] ECR II-
3141. 
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scheme will be of critical importance in the assessment of the 
justifiability of the arrangement under Article 81(3) EC. 
 
Thus, it seems strongly arguable that, if any restriction of competition is 
found in our proposed scheme, it may be exempted from the prohibition of 
Article 81(1) EC by virtue of the application of the conditions laid down in 
Article 81(3) EC. (An identical conclusion should follow under the purely UK 
law analysis under the CA 1998, since the substantive criteria in these 
circumstances are the same.) 
 
5.3 Legal analysis of the proposed scheme – conclusions 
 
As a result of the foregoing analysis, it is tolerably clear that the proposed 
scheme satisfies the criteria imposed by the multifarious legal provisions that 
apply to the interests and issues raised in this sector. So long as the justifiable 
level of remuneration is met for both pre-existing expectations as to ROC 
generation and for the price for renewable generation under the proposed 
take-or-pay contract scheme is met, it seems that problems with regard to 
fundamental rights protection, EC trade law, EC State aid law and 
competition law (whether at EC or national level) can be met satisfactorily. 
The following section seeks to clarify this beyond doubt by assessing the 
quantification of the economic impacts of the proposed new renewables 
promotion scheme. 
 




Figure 1 illustrates the different revenue requirements for a project as a 
function of the risks the investor has to carry.  
 
Where the entry into a long-term take-or-pay contract with a credible counter-
party is concerned, the main risk with which an investor is left is the risk of 
the project or technology failing or being exposed to higher than expected 
maintenance costs. The investor or his agent is in the best position to manage 
that risk (e.g. by diligent maintenance or choice of technology), therefore this 
risk should remain entirely with the investor (other then possibly for early 
stage technologies). Under a take-or-pay contract, the investor only faces the 
risk of foregone revenues when the generator is down. Experience from other 
markets suggests that this is sufficient to ensure efforts to achieve high 
availability levels. This assumption will need to be revisited once large shares 
of UK electricity are provided from generation technologies that have 
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correlated technological failure rates, while renewable resource-related 
























































































































































































Figure 1 Illustration of revenue requirement as function of risk carried by investor 
 
Investors would face a higher level of project risk if they were to receive a 
fixed ROC price for the duration of their project. In this case, they would 
remain exposed to uncertainty about future energy prices. Due to some 
regulatory restrictions for domestic consumers to sign long-term contracts for 
project-relevant durations, this risk can be assumed to be partially 
regulatorily induced. As discussed in section two, investors face the further 
risk that future market design will implement a different congestion 
management scheme or a balancing market that could affect congestion costs. 
The changes in costs or forgone energy and ROC revenues are both a function 
of the regulatory choice of such a future market design and of the generation 
mix at this future time. Uncertainty about future energy prices and congestion 
and balancing costs justifies a risk premium for higher revenues for investors 
that are rewarded with a fixed ROC price rather than being offered long term 
take-or-pay contracts. 
 
In the current environment, the future ROC price is a function of the future 
regulatory decisions on the renewables quota, qualification of different 
technologies, the buy out price and potential banding. But the future ROC 
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price also depends upon the response of other investors to the regulatory 
framework: e.g. the penetration of the market by different renewable energy 
technologies. This creates both regulatory and market uncertainty, which 
justifies an additional risk premium for investors.  
 
The current RO scheme provides an undifferentiated payment to all 
technologies and locations. Projects that use a less expensive technology (co-
firing) or a good resource location (e.g. high wind speed), can make more 
revenues than would be required for the project to break even. The ongoing 
discussion relating to the banding of the ROC aims to introduce some 
differentiation in the revenues that projects can receive from the RO scheme. 
The additional regulatory flexibility introduced by this approach can allow 
future regulators to discriminate against past investors, and might thus 
increase the risk premia required to compensate for the regulatory 
uncertainty. 
 
Here, we have attempted to provide a first quantification of the different 
revenue levels currently observed in the UK context. Our analysis focuses 
upon the impact of risk and uncertainty. The Carbon Trust, (2006) provides a 
detailed quantification of additional revenues (or savings) if 
technologies/resources basis receive differential treatment.  
 
We will first look at project costs, then contract prices that approximate the 
level of fixed ROC prices and finally projected revenue streams under the 
current scheme as indication of the break even point. 
 
6.2 Cost of wind generation 
 
The IEA study “Projected costs of generating electricity”, generation costs 
projected wind power generation costs (IEA 2005). Figure 2 illustrates the 
distribution of costs calculated across different countries and projects. 
Assuming a real discount rate of 5% the median generation costs are 33 
£/MWh, increasing to 45 £/MWh if 10% real discount rate is assumed 
(exchange rate USD/GBP 0.601468 on 1/7/03). As most costs are incurred up-
front, the interest payments increase with higher discount rates, and therefore 





































































Figure 2 Electricity generation costs from wind power for 19 projects in 11 countries (based 
on IEA 2005) 
 
To illustrate the sensitivity of generation costs, Table 1 gives the costs 
calculated at locations with different wind speeds, as predicted by Enviros 
(2005).  
 
Table 1 Generation cost by wind speed, estimated by Enviros (2005)27
 
Windspeed (m/s) Cost Of Generation 2005 (£/MWh) 
 Maximum 
(£/MWh) 
Average (£/MWh) Minimum 
(£/MWh) 
5.5 85.4 76.3 71.5 
6 69.8 62.1 58.5 
6.5 68.3 61.2 57.2 
7 59.5 53.0 49.8 
7.5 52.7 47.3 44.1 
  
Generation costs are a function of multiple components of up front 
investment costs and later costs for maintenance, operation and grid 
connection (Figure 3). The overall costs for producing wind energy calculated 
at about 55£/MWh based on Enviros assumptions are a bit higher than most 
IEA projections. This is mainly driven by Enviros’s assumption of annual 
maintenance and management costs at 5% of total capital expenditure, or 
£15.73/MWh. This is significantly higher than in most country projections. In 
                                                 
27 Enviros estimated generation costs for UK windfarms for a range of 5m/s to 9m/s. We only 
replicate the data for the range 5.5- 7.5m/s.  
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IEA (2005) only 3 of 17 projections assumed costs above £10/MWh with 












































































£/MWh Annual costsInvestment cost
 
Figure 3 Costs components – as assumed by Enviros28
 
6.3 Observed contract prices for output of wind generators 
 
While contract terms are commercially sensitive and not made public, the 
rumours as to those prices and the length of RO contracts seem to converge. 
Figure 4 summarises the results from our review. 
 
Short-term contracts typically refer to yearly contracts, but could cover up to 
three years (Scottish Renewables Briefing 2003; Toke 2005). Their prices seem 
to range between from £70 to £90/MWh.  
 
Long-term contracting has been limited in the UK (Steen 2002; Mitchell 2006; 
REFOCUS (March/April 2003)). It is understood that most “long-term 
contracts” under the RO are of a five-year span, although there are rumours 
that some ten and even fifteen year contracts have been concluded. The longer 
the term of the contract, the greater the ROC price uncertainty and the more 
                                                 
28 We use assumptions of the Enviros study (Enviros 2005)to illustrate the different cost 
components of a wind project. Assuming 5 turbines of 2MW are set up in England at 7 m/w 
average wind speed (capacity factor 31%), discount rate 7.5%, depreciation over 15 years.   
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heavily suppliers discount the contracted price.29 Overall, it seems that most 
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Figure 4 Contract prices for short-term (<1 year) and long-term contracts (~5-15 years) 
delivered under the RO. Source: (Scottish Renewables Briefing 2003; Oxera 2005; Toke 
2005; Van der Linden 2005; SmartestEnergy (Tim Foster) 2006; Tradelink Solutions (Bob 
Middleton) 2006) 
 
6.4 Projected revenue streams for wind output 
 
Under the current UK promotional scheme, renewable generators receive 
three types of revenue streams (Mitchell 2004; Mitchell 2006). First, revenue 
from energy sales; second, revenue from the levy exemption certificate; and, 
third, revenue from the ROC sales, including the recycling premium.  
 
Following Butler and Neuhoff (2004), we have projected two scenarios for 
future revenue streams of a wind project. We assume rather low energy 
prices, which are increased by the opportunity costs of CO2 allowances 
trading.  
 
In the first scenario (Figure 5) we assume high build rates, such that 
renewable targets are achieved and the recycling premium falls to zero. The 
scarcity value of the ROC declines gradually over time.  
 
                                                 
29 "In general, the shorter the contract that the developers were able to accept, or the more 
flexible the terms, the higher would be the amounts of money they would receive." (Toke 
2007) pg 282. 
30 While past evidence suggested that some requested contracts were at such discounted 
prices that projects were no longer commercially viable (House of Lords 2004), this might 


































































Figure 5 Projected energy revenue for wind project, with gradually declining ROC buy-out 
value 
 
In the second scenario (Figure 6) we assume that only 70% of the target is 
achieved at 2015. After 2015/16, following some studies we assume a cliff 
edge: i.e. the target will be reached 100% and lack of scarcity drives the ROC 
price to zero. However, there is the possibility of conversion to UK ETS 
allowances at 0.43 tonnes per MWh. Applying the current allowance price 
under the UK ETS, this corresponds to about £1/MWh. 
 
The sudden shift post-2015 does not seem very plausible as: (a) it will take 
some time to build the remaining 30% of renewables relative to the target 
level; and (b) risk averse investors, decommissioning of some projects and the 
exercise of market power might imply that some scarcity level will remain 
post-2015. Hence this second scenario can be seen as a lower bound for the 
































































Figure 6 Projected energy revenue for wind project, cliff edge post 2016 
 
 
To compare both scenarios, we calculated an equivalent revenue per MWh, 
which delivers the same net present value of revenues if received constantly 
over 20 years. 
 
With gradually declining ROC prices the equivalent revenues for a project 
built in 2006 are £60.70/MWh, while revenues with 70% of the target level 
reached by 2015 and assumed cliff edge post-2015 are £66.50/MWh.  
 
6.5 How does it all add up? 
 
Figure 7 compares for the current scheme the IEA projected costs of wind 
projects with long-term contract prices and projected revenues under the RO 
scheme. Given the good wind resource of the UK, the costs per MWh should 
be at the lower end of the IEA projections, and therefore the expected ranking 
of costs below long-term contract prices (certain) below expected revenues 
(risky) is satisfied. 
 
 33











































































































































Figure 7 Quantification of the transition 
 
A future take-or-pay contract that would cover all regulatory risk for market 
participants and would last for, e.g., 20 years could be priced close to project 
costs. Differentiation across renewable resource bases and technologies allows 
a further reduction of the take-or-pay contracts, e.g. for good on-shore wind 
resources. 
 
How would current projects be treated in such a future scheme? Their first 
option is to continue to produce ROCs and ask NGT for remuneration at a 
fixed price, e.g. until 2025. The fixed remuneration will reduce revenue 
uncertainty for current projects. Therefore, the price of the ROC remuneration 
can be set at the value of the certainty equivalent of current uncertain future 
revenue streams, e.g. below the projected revenue streams. Investors will 
continue to face uncertainty about the corresponding energy revenue streams, 
balancing market arrangements, and connection and system use costs; 
therefore, the ROC price together with the expected energy revenue should be 
set above the contract price for take-or pay contracts. Investors also have the 
option, perhaps with a cut-off date, to swap over to a take-or-pay contract. If 
the price levels of the take-or-pay contract and of the ROC remuneration price 
are set appropriately, investors are likely to be indifferent between the two 
approaches; this will hold unless their contractual and financing 
arrangements influence their preferred choice. 
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How will the arrangement affect investment during the transitional period 
(e.g., from the period when discussions about a change to take-or pay 
contracts starts until they can be offered following a change of the regulatory 
arrangement, how will the proposed scheme operate)? Any investment that is 
commissioned during the transitional period can produce ROCs during that 
transitional period. The current ROC value is comfortably high (e.g. 
£45/MWh) as the renewable deployment volume is low relative to the 
renewable target. This gap between current volume and the renewable target 
is unlikely to be closed significantly in the next two years, therefore there is a 
high certainty that ROC values will remain high during the transitional 
period. This can be seen in the extremely high price levels of short-term 
contracts in this field. This creates a strong incentive to accelerate projects. 
They can first harvest the high ROC values and then be covered by the 
comfortable provisions of long-term take-or-pay contracts. This does, 
however, require that these provisions be spelt out clearly and credibly, and 
as quickly as possible. So long as certainty about future take-or-pay contract 
provisions does not exist, investment can still go forward as investors will 
rely upon the property rights protection of the RO scheme. As the 
continuation of the RO scheme with a significant positive RO value is 
required, investors can continue to make projections based upon the 




The Renewables Obligation scheme in the UK is currently under review. The 
first concern is that an undifferentiated payment through the ROC to all 
renewable technologies does not support a portfolio of technologies and 
locations. If the ROC price were to increase sufficiently to support offshore 
wind and a portfolio of technologies, then on-shore wind and other infra-
marginal renewable technologies could receive unnecessarily high support 
payments that would be at the cost of consumers. A second concern is that, 
even for marginal technologies, the support payments have to be 
unnecessarily high to compensate investors for regulatory uncertainty 
relating to the shape of the future RO scheme, balancing arrangements and 
the congestion management mechanism. 
 
It has been proposed to band the RO such that different technologies or 
locations can receive different support levels. In simple models, the 
proponents of this approach illustrate how it can reduce inframarginal 
payments and support a portfolio of renewable technologies. We are 
concerned, however, that the additional flexibility for the regulator in 
designing and evolving this banding will further increase regulatory 
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uncertainty, such that the risk premium required by investors and paid by 
consumers could increase even further. 
 
In this paper we therefore propose to move from the RO to long-term take-or-
pay contracts for renewable technologies. In our straw man scenario, we 
would assume that the regulator defines on an annual basis the terms of the 
long-term contracts that are signed to cover projects during the following 
year. The contract duration would be about 20 years to facilitate project 
financing and the contract would guarantee a payment whenever the 
renewable energy provider (wind, marine, solar) is technically available and 
has the renewable resource available to produce electricity. We propose that 
the grid operator, National Grid or DNO, is the designated counter-party and 
offers to sign such contracts with any renewable energy project (with a 
potentially quantity restricted auction for large-scale off-shore projects). The 
grid operator would pass on any extra costs (or, at times of high fuel prices, 
benefits) that these long-term contracts might offer to electricity consumers as 
part of the network usage charges. Alternatively a separate institution, 
perhaps similarly structured to the Non-Fossil Purchasing Agency Ltd, could 
serve as the counter-party for long-term contracts if the government provides 
the necessary credit guarantees to ensure the credibility of these long-term 
contracts. 
 
The proposed long-term take-or-pay contracts insulate projects from the 
regulatory risk caused by future changes to renewable support levels and 
policies, balancing and congestion management market designs. These 
contracts also insulate renewable projects from uncertainty about future 
energy prices that could be induced by changing fuel or carbon prices. 
Consumers benefit from these long-term contracts – the removal of regulatory 
risk reduces overall costs while covering the situation where, for example, gas 
prices or generation scarcity operate to push up electricity wholesale prices. In 
such circumstances, the grid operator will sell renewable energy from the 
take-or-pay contracts at a profit. This profit will be passed on to consumers in 
the form of reduced network usage charges. 
 
Any projects that are commissioned before the new arrangement is in place 
have the option to sign long-term take-or-pay contracts for 20 years minus the 
number of years for which they have already been in operation. 
  
To satisfy the legal requirements implied by property rights protection, 
existing projects can choose to continue to produce ROCs. These ROCs will be 
remunerated at a price that will be announced for the entire duration of the 
RO scheme. This fixed revenue stream again facilitates the financing and 
refinancing of existing assets. It also ensures that existing projects will receive 
 36
sufficient remuneration, and thus satisfy legal requirements and the need for 
government to foster its credibility in an emerging market. The remuneration 
of the ROCs can be performed by the same agency that is counter-party of the 
long-term take-or-pay contracts. The agency could also take over the 
responsibilities currently covered by the Non-Fossil Purchasing Agency Ltd. 
Thus, a proliferation of institutions responsible for renewable support can be 
avoided. 
 
Any projects that are commissioned in the transition period (e.g. before the 
proposed take-or-pay contracts are available), will first benefit from the 
currently rather high ROC prices and can then either select to use long-term 
take-or-pay contracts or a long-term guaranteed remuneration of the ROC. 
This makes early investment for any inframarginal projects (like on-shore 
wind power) attractive, and therefore ensures continued investment during 
the transitional period. 
 
We are also mindful of the relevant legal considerations that would have to be 
satisfied by any proposed new renewable electricity promotion scheme. In 
this paper, we also provide a preliminary analysis of the constraints imposed 
by the fundamental right to protect acquired property rights, alongside the 
issues raised by EC law rules on the free movement of goods (here, 
electricity). Both of these issues respond to a proportionality test, which will 
establish an acceptable range within which existing rights to exercise and 
generate ROCs should receive compensation during the transitional period. 
Further, there are legal issues relating to the possible State aid embodied in 
any transitional regime that compensates for such acquired property rights, 
but also with regard to the level of price support for the generation of 
electricity from renewable sources under the proposed take-or-pay contract 
scheme. It is suggested that the proposed scheme does not amount to State 
aid under EC law and, even if it is argued that State aid is involved, that it 
would clearly be justifiable State aid provided that it is notified as such. 
Finally, it is not impossible that the proposed scheme may be subject to 
challenge under antitrust law as a restrictive practice: this issue is also 
analysed under EC and UK law, with the conclusion that it is likely that such 
competition law problems do not in fact arise (due to the fact that the system 
is effectively mandated by justifiable State regulation) and that, even if 
competition law is an issue, that the proposed scheme is justifiable under 





1. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1950) 
 
Protocol 1, Article 1 – Protection of Property 
 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 






In the U.K., the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘the Act’) was enacted ‘to give 
further effect to the rights and freedoms granted under the European 
Convention on Human Rights’.31 Among the ‘Convention Rights’ that it 
covers, the Act includes Article 1 of the First Protocol.32 Furthermore, it is 
clear from the wording of Article 1 of the First Protocol that legal persons may 
also rely upon its provisions (indeed, it is the only right in the Convention 
which is expressly conferred upon legal persons), provided that the company 
owning the property falls within the definition of a ‘victim’ of a breach of 
                                                 
31 It should be remembered that the Human Rights Act 1998 has carefully preserved 
Parliamentary sovereignty (see s. 4). This means that any national primary legislation can 
only be declared by a U.K. court to be ‘incompatible’ with the Convention Rights; this will not 
have the effect of making the legislation somehow void or unenforceable. However, it is also 
the case that the promoter of any legislation will have to make a declaration in the House of 
Commons that the legislation proposed is in conformity with the Convention, or (if not) to 
say where and why not. This forms an important part of the lobbying process in the 
negotiation, debate and eventual adoption of legislation by Parliament. So, despite the fact 
that the Human Rights law arguments which follow in this short paper will not enable a 
challenge to primary legislation, they may prove a powerful force in shaping the legislation 
before it reaches the statute book. Furthermore, the courts will be reluctant to make a 
declaration of incompatibility and will instead strive to interpret legislation (wherever 
possible) to be in compliance with Convention Rights. 
32 See s. 1(1)(b) HRA 1998. 
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Human Rights.33 However, to establish whether the facts in a ‘stranded costs’ 
scenario do fall within Article 1 of the First Protocol, certain other elements 





This concept has a meaning autonomous to the Convention34 and has 
generally been construed broadly by the Court. It is clear that immovable and 
movable property are covered by Article 1, so, in the stranded costs 
situation,35 any investments in new plant (such as extraction or treatment 
facilities, or pipelines) will be protected by the Convention. Any issues of 
long-term contractual arrangements may prove slightly more difficult. In 
principle, an established interest with economic value is necessary, so that a 
legal right to receive a certain benefit may be sufficient, even if certain 
conditions must be satisfied; however, ‘mere expectations’ will not be 
sufficiently certain to qualify as ‘possessions’ under Article 1.36 An accrued 
claim for negligence, which was later removed by retrospective legislation, 
was held to be a ‘possession’ under Article 137 and given that contractual 
rights have been held to fall within ‘possessions’,38 I would submit that such 
                                                 
33 See s. 7(1) HRA 1998; in s. 7(7), ‘victim’ is defined as being a victim for the purposes of 
Article 34 ECHR, which requires the applicant to be ‘directly affected’ by the action of the 
public body in question. It is also worth noting that s. 7(1) allows an application to be made in 
anticipation that a certain course of action will make the applicant a ‘victim’ at a later date 
(viz: ‘if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act). I am assuming here that there is no 
question of a shareholder trying to show victim status: in any case, it seems that the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg is generally not in 
favour of such a possibility – only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ will the Court countenance 
the ‘piercing of the corporate veil’ in this manner, such as where the company’s articles of 
association (or similar) would prevent the company from bringing an action in its own name). 
See, further, Agrotexim v. Greece (1996) 21 EHRR 250 (esp. at para. 66 of the judgment). 
34 See, e.g., Gasus Dösier-und Fördertechnik v. Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403, para. 53. Thus, 
just because domestic law does not see a particular right as ‘property’ does not exclude the 
possibility that Article of the First Protocol may be applicable. 
35 Examples are taken here from the analysis and Decisions of the Commission of the 
European Communities in relation to stranded costs in the electricity sector, pursuant to 
Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC [1997] OJ L27/20: see Commission Communication relating to 
the methodology for analysing State aid linked to stranded costs (26 July 2001), which 
document is available on the internet at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/stranded_costs/en.pdf (last 
visited 4 October 2005). See further the brief article by Allibert in the Commission’s 
Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 3, October 2001, pp. 25-27, discussing the Decisions 
taken by the Commission on the applications by Austria, Spain and the Netherlands. 
36 See Batelaan and Huiges v. Netherlands (1984) 41 DR 170 (ECommHR). 
37 See Pressos Compañia Naviera v. Belgium (1995) 21 EHRR 301, at para. 31. 
38 A, B and Company v. Germany (1978) 14 DR 146, at 168 (ECommHR). 
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long-term contractual arrangements should also be so treated. Thus, it would 
appear that the likely subject matter of any stranded costs claim would count 
as a ‘possession’ under Article 1 of the First Protocol.39
 
 
1(c) Which type of infringement? 
 
It is important to identify precisely which type of infringement of the right to 
peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions is in issue, because the analysis of 
how any such infringement may be justified is dependent upon the nature 
and extent of the infringement involved. Typically, the Strasbourg Court has 
begun by analysing whether the alleged infringement amounts to a 
deprivation or a control of the use of possessions; only if neither of these is 





The main test for ‘deprivation’ of property is the extinction of the owner’s 
rights in the property, usually by means of a legal transfer of those rights to 
another by operation of law or the exercise of a legal power to do so. It seems 
unlikely that such a situation would arise in the context of stranded costs 
cases, unless the view were taken that the only way to promote competition 
would be to force current incumbents to transfer certain companies or assets 
to new market entrants. Such a move would be a state act and would no 
doubt be laid down in the relevant legal framework (thus satisfying the basic 
conditions for such a deprivation).40 However, even in this hypothetical 
situation, the typical method would be to force the sale of such assets, thus 
ensuring some form of compensation for the incumbent operator. The 
adequacy of the compensation that such a method might provide falls to be 
considered below, under the proportionality and compensation headings. 
 
                                                 
39 Of course, without fuller factual details of any precise stranded costs claim, this conclusion 
must remain a provisional one. 
40 It should be noted that the reference to ‘the general principles of international law’ as a 
condition for such deprivation of property has been held by the European Court to be 
relevant only in the situation where the party claiming interference with his possessions is not 
a national of the expropriating state: see James v. U.K. (1986) 8 EHRR 123, confirmed in 
Lithgow v. U.K. (1986) 8 EHRR 329, at (inter alia) para. 115. However, given the approach of 
the Court to compensation in deprivation cases (considered briefly below, see section 1(d)(iii), 
infra), the inapplicability of the public international law principle (requiring compensation to 
be given to non-nationals for deprivation of their property) is unlikely to make much 
difference in practice. 
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The Court has been prepared to countenance the possibility of a de facto 
deprivation: the substance of the matter will be examined to ascertain 
whether, in spite of formal legal ownership or possession remaining with the 
applicant, the practical consequence of the interference has been one of 
deprivation. However, the Court has been extremely wary of finding de facto 
deprivation in the cases: only in exceptional circumstances will it be made 
out, such as where coins had been confiscated and held by police, without 
bringing charges against their owner. When courts and government 
recognised the unlawfulness of the police action and that the original owners 
had remained owners throughout the confiscation period, and yet attempts to 
recover the coins failed in the national courts, the Strasbourg Court did find 
there to have been a de facto expropriation.41
 
1(c)(ii) Control of use 
 
The distinction between ‘deprivation’ and ‘control of use’ infringements can 
often be an untidy one, but is important due to the different approaches taken 
to the issues of proportionality and compensation under these two headings. 
Use of property may be controlled either by imposing positive requirements 
upon individuals to act in a particular way with regard to their property (such 
as requiring the planting of trees to promote environmental protection)42 or 
by restricting the activities of individuals (such as planning controls and 
environmental orders). 
 
An example is that of the economic regulation of the professions, 
which was found by the European Commission on Human Rights to be a 
control of the use of possessions.43 Similarly, the revocation of licences which 
affect business interests44 may also amount to a sufficient interference by 
control of use: e.g., the revocation of a licence to sell alcoholic beverages in a 
restaurant45 or the revocation of a licence to extract gravel.46 It may be argued 
that these situations are analogous (or at least sufficiently similar in nature 
and outcome) to be applied to the stranded costs scenario, where (for 
example) the use of plant in which investments had been made under 
different regulatory assumptions is now rendered highly uneconomic, 
because of levels of price and/or conduct regulation that will be introduced. I 
would tentatively submit, therefore, that the stranded costs fact scenario 
                                                 
41 Vasilescu v. Romania (1998) 28 EHRR 241, esp. para. 53. 
42 Denev v. Sweden (1989) 59 DR 127 (ECommHR). 
43 See, e.g., Karni v. Sweden (1988) 55 DR 157 (ECommHR). 
44 Provided that the licence-holder had a reasonable and legitimate expectation as to its lasting 
nature: see Gudmunsson v. Iceland (1996) 21 EHRR CD 89. 
45 Tre Traktörer v. Sweden (1989) 13 EHRR 309, para. 53. 
46 Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1) (1991) 13 EHRR 784, para. 53. 
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would be most likely to amount to an interference with possessions in the 
form of a control of their use, imposed by the state in the form of legal 
provisions. 
 
1(c)(iii) Interference with peaceful enjoyment 
 
However, even if the foregoing analysis is not persuasive (and thus the 
stranded costs scenario would amount neither to a deprivation of possessions 
nor to a control of their use), it is still possible that the act in question may be 
held to be an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. This is 
often seen as ‘a kind of ‘catch-all’ category for any kind of interference which 
is hard to pin down’.47 The leading case48 here concerns the subjection of 
properties to expropriation permits for many years. These permits permitted 
proceedings for expropriation at a later date, without depriving the owners of 
their property or their use thereof. The property was never in fact 
expropriated and the Court held there to have been no deprivation, nor 
control of the use of the property; nevertheless, the existence of the permits ‘in 
practice significantly reduced the possibility of [the] exercise’ of their 
property rights and amounted to an interference with the substance of their 
ownership of their land.49 While some of the cases which have been decided 
under this heading of interference could arguably have been held to fall 
within the deprivation or control of use categories, it is likely that the fact 
scenarios raised by a stranded costs situation would be caught by this 
residual provision (even if the above analysis on control of use proves 
unpersuasive). 
 
1(c)(iv) Tentative conclusion 
 
Thus, it seems that such actions require justification if they are to be lawful 
under the Convention and, therefore, U.K. law as embodied in the Human 




1(d) Justifiability of infringement and questions of compensation 
 
In all situations where an infringement by means of some interference with 
possessions has been shown, the state must show that this interference was 
justifiable to escape a finding that its conduct has been unlawful. There are 
                                                 
47 (Sermet L. 1998), p. 29. 
48 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35. 
49 Ibid., at para. 60. 
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separate elements50 to be considered here, but it should not be forgotten that 
there is an essential link between how the public interest is defined and the 
shape of the proportionality argument that follows. Indeed, the question of 
compensation is definitely a part of that proportionality analysis, but given its 
centrality to the stranded costs scenario, it will be highlighted separately in 
what follows. 
 
1(d)(i) Public interest/General interest 
 
Any justification for an infringement upon the right to the peaceful enjoyment 
of possessions must state the grounds upon which that interference is to be 
made. While it is unclear whether or not the different wording51 used in 
Article 1 of the First Protocol is intended to produce different consequences 
for the different grounds of claim, and given that the Court has not yet ruled 
on whether the difference in wording has any substantive consequences, it is 
submitted that this is unlikely to be of any practical significance, given the 
Court’s rather permissive attitude towards claimed grounds of public/general 
interest justification. The Court has tended to be deferential to the Member 
States’ definitions and explanations of why a certain restriction was necessary: 
for example, leasehold enfranchisement legislation in the U.K. was held to be 
a policy calculated to enhance social justice within the community and 
therefore was ‘properly described as being “in the public interest”’.52
 
On the case law as it stands, therefore, it seems highly likely that the 
type of public/general interest ground that would be relied upon by the state 
in a stranded costs scenario (such as improving the environmental 
sustainability of electricity generation, while encouraging investment in 
technology development and competition in innovation) would be difficult 
and perhaps impossible to characterise as not being acceptable under the 
                                                 
50 I have assumed throughout that any interference will be laid down by statute or secondary 
legislation and will thus meet the criterion of being ‘conditions provided by law’ which is 
necessary for any justifiable infringement of Convention Rights. This basis in law must be 
accessible, sufficiently certain and must provide protection against arbitrary abuses. Thus, it 
is not only a requirement to be able to point to a positive legal provision empowering the 
body in question to take the action of which the applicant complains; there is also an element 
of the ‘Rule of Law’ about this requirement.  
51 I.e. ‘public interest’ with regard to deprivation and ‘general interest’ with regard to control 
of use. While there is no specific language concerning this issue in relation to the more 
general ground of interference with peaceful enjoyment of possessions, the Court has 
required a ‘legitimate aim’ to be shown in its operation of the ‘fair balance’ test (see the text, 
infra, at section 1(d)(ii) ff.): here, too, the Court has shown great deference to the Member 
States’ public interest choices (see, e.g., Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1) (1991) 13 EHRR 784, at para. 
51). 
52 James v. U.K. (1986) 8 EHRR 123, at para. 49. 
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Convention. However, the ground of public interest may be legitimate, but it 
must still be analysed whether or not the means chosen to fulfil that ground 




Although there is no express reference to a proportionality test in the wording 
of Article 1 of the First Protocol, it is clear from the Strasbourg Court’s 
jurisprudence that such a requirement is inherent in that Article. 
Proportionality is a general principle of the Convention and requires there to 
be a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed 
and the aim sought to be realised’.53 In the context of Article 1 of the First 
Protocol, the Court has developed a requirement that a ‘fair balance’ must be 
struck ‘between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights’.54 This 
approach is followed by the Court in all cases of infringement of Article 1 of 
the First Protocol, whether concerning deprivation, control of use or more 
general interference with the enjoyment of possessions. 
 
It is important to note that the intensity of the proportionality test 
applied will vary according to the severity of the infringement in question. 
‘Deprivation of property is inherently more serious than a control of its use’,55 
thus suggesting that it will be more difficult to argue that the action of a 
public body in depriving a company of its property is a proportionate way to 
achieve the public interest goal at issue. In any application of the idea of fair 
balance, however, it is clear that two elements will be key: first, is there any 
entitlement for the property owner to compensation for the interference 
suffered? Second, is there any procedure open to the applicant to challenge 
the measure that has caused the interference with his possessions? (In the 
stranded costs situation, a good example of the procedural element is 
provided by Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC,56 under which Member States 
were allowed to develop plans to compensate incumbent companies for 
stranded costs. These plans were then to be submitted to the Commission of 
the European Communities within a certain period of time for their 
examination in accordance with the EC’s State aid rules.) Equally, the absence 
of any such procedure may well lead to a finding that the interference is a 
disproportionate one that fails to respect the balance to be struck between the 
                                                 
53 James v. U.K. (1986) 8 EHRR 123, at para. 50. 
54 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para. 69. 
55 See Gillow v. U.K. (1989) 11 EHRR 335 for a clear recognition of this point. 
56 See n. 5, supra. 
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competing interests at stake.57 Given that the key element in the stranded 
costs scenario will be a company’s claim to be entitled to compensation, this 




It would appear that there is no absolute right under the Convention to 
receive compensation in return for an interference with the right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions. Rather, the availability and extent of 
any compensation falls to be considered as part of the overall analysis of the 
proportionality of the interfering measure. However, it is also accurate to 
state that the more serious the infringement of the right to peaceful enjoyment 
of one’s possessions, the stronger the presumption that at least some 
compensation must be paid for the ‘fair balance’ of interests to be respected. 
 
- deprivation of possessions: 
 
Only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ will the taking of property without 
justification be justifiable; otherwise, the protection afforded by Article 1 of 
the First Protocol ‘would be largely illusory and ineffective’.58 However, while 
compensation should normally be an amount ‘reasonably related to [the] 
value’ of the property taken, there is no ‘guarantee [of] a right of full 
compensation in all circumstances, since legitimate objectives of public 
interest, such as pursued in measures of economic reform …, may call for less 
than reimbursement of the full market value … ’.59 This seems to imply that 
there is a proportional relationship between the nature and extent of the 
public interest, on the one hand, and the individual burden to be borne, on 
the other. That is to say that ‘the greater the public gain to be achieved by the 
legitimate aim, the greater the financial burden the property owner can be 
expected to bear. To this extent the state enjoys a wide margin of appreciation 
in calculating compensation terms’.60
 
Overall, the defendant States have not been successful in arguing that 
their case falls within the ‘exceptional circumstances’ needed to escape the 
                                                 
57 See Sporrong and Lönnroth, n. 18, supra for a good example, although here it was the 
combination of the failure to provide any means of compensation with the lack of any 
opportunity to challenge the measures which seemed to tip the balance overall. This 
illustrates the interlinked nature of the proportionality analysis in such cases, covering many 
different and yet connected issues. 
58 Lithgow v. U.K., n. 10, supra; see esp. paras. 80-83. 
59 Ibid. 
60 (Rook 2001), p. 72. 
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need to provide compensation.61 However, there are examples where the 
Court has been rather deferential to the terms upon which compensation has 
been calculated.62
 
- control of use: 
 
By contrast, States have been far more successful in justifying a failure to pay 
compensation in cases involving the control of the use of the applicant’s 
property.63 The European Commission on Human Rights has gone so far as to 
say that, as a rule, control of use does not contain a right to compensation. 
However, as has been discussed briefly above, the dividing line between 
deprivation and control of use cases is a fine one and the Court’s 
characterisation of various State measures has been uncertain enough to 
suggest that this statement is perhaps both too bold in nature and too broad 
in scope. The flip side of this leniency is that where some compensation has 
been paid in control of use cases, the Commission often seemed to treat this as 
conclusive proof that there has been no violation of Article 1 of the First 
Protocol.64 There has been a reluctance on the part of the Court to 
countenance compensation where the applicant was involved in a commercial 
venture containing an element of risk, especially where the applicant was 
aware of the general factual circumstances that led to the eventual control on 
its use of the property.65
 
- general observations: 
 
However, given the existence of case law both under the control of use 
heading and the more general category of ‘interference’, I would submit that 
                                                 
61 (O’Boyle H and Warbrick 1995), p. 532 suggest that a possible example might be seizure of 
property during times of war, while (Rook 2001), p. 71, n. 2 suggests that a local authority 
landlord exercising the remedy of distress for rent might be another. 
62 See Lithgow v. U.K., n. 10, supra, where the calculation of the compensation paid to a 
company which was to be nationalised was made on the basis of the value of its shares at a 
point before the announcement of the nationalisation plan, rather than on the basis of 
company assets held at the date of nationalisation. The Court acknowledged that such a 
broad public interest issue as nationalisation legislation involved the consideration of a very 
wide range of competing interests, which the Member State and its national authorities were 
best placed to assess. Overall, the Court found that adequate reasons did exist for the 
compensation criteria chosen and, as a result, held the U.K. to be within its margin of 
appreciation and thus found no violation of the Convention.  
63 E.g., James v. U.K., n. 10, supra, saw the Court find no breach of the Convention by the U.K.’s 
leasehold reforms which allowed some tenants to purchase the property which they were 
renting, with its consequent impact upon the value of the property owned by the applicant 
64 See, e.g., Banér v. Sweden (1989) 60 DR 128 (ECommHR) and, more recently, in Pinnacle Meat 
Processors v. U.K. Application 33298/96, 21 Oct 1998 (ECommHR) (Decision on Admissibility). 
65 See Pine Valley Developments v. Ireland (1991) 14 EHRR 319, at para. 59. 
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it would be inaccurate to conclude that this apparently more permissive 
approach means that there is no prospect of raising a human rights argument 
in support of a claim for compensation for stranded costs as a result of 
legislation designed to increase competition in a particular sector. 
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that full, market-value compensation is not 
even necessarily required in relation to deprivation cases, so it would be 
foolish to expect anything but a similar (if not, indeed, even more lenient) 
assessment under the other categories of interference. 
 
A particularly apposite example for the purposes of stranded costs 
scenarios is provided by the case of Stran Greek Refineries,66 which concerned 
measures taken by the new democratic government of Greece to overturn a 
contract made for the construction of a crude oil refinery by the applicants. 
The government argued that the termination of the contract was necessary to 
avoid prejudice to the national economy and the applicant claimed that he 
should be compensated for expenditure incurred in preparing to carry out the 
contract. The national courts later held that an arbitral award (which had 
declared that the applicants were entitled to some compensation for the 
termination of the contract) was rendered void by the legislation that had 
terminated the contract. While the national court’s preliminary judgment 
favoured the applicant, the Strasbourg Court held that this amounted to a 
mere hope that they would receive confirmation of their claim once the full 
investigation had been carried out. However, the arbitral award was final and 
binding and established the State’s liability up to a maximum amount, thus 
amounting to a ‘possession’ within Article 1 of the First Protocol. The Court 
then ruled that the effect of the legislation nullifying the arbitral award was to 
interfere with67 the applicant’s property right and accepted that the ground 
relied upon by the Greek State was a valid one in the public interest. 
However, its failure to provide (or indeed to accept that the arbitrators had 
obliged it to provide) compensation for the termination of the contract ‘upset, 
to the detriment of the applicants, the balance that must be struck between the 
protection of the right of property and the requirements of public interest.’ 
 
However, this outcome should be carefully contrasted with the result 
of the Lithgow case in the Strasbourg Court,68 which illustrates clearly the need 
to examine the facts of each individual case very carefully on its own merits. 
Drawing general conclusions on the assessment of the proportionality and 
                                                 
66 Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece (1995) 19 EHRR 293. 
67 Rather than to deprive the applicants of their property, although it is of course highly 
arguable that deprivation was in fact precisely what the effect of the legislation had been (see, 
e.g., (Clayton R. and Tomlinson H 2000), p. 1310, n. 152. 
68 See the summary in n. 32, supra. 
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compensation criteria may well prove a dangerous exercise, so caution should 
be exercised. 
 
Two final points should be made in this brief survey of the possible 
availability of compensation for interference with property rights in stranded 
costs situations. First, it should be noted that the position under the wording 
of Article 1 of the First Protocol differs from that which obtains in many 
Commonwealth constitutions and in the U.S.A., where the constitutional 
provisions themselves provide for the possibility of expropriation only if full 
compensation is paid. Issues of control of use of property are more 
complicated: originally, the U.S. courts considered that ‘regulatory control’ of 
property attracted only the protection of the due process clause of the 
Constitution and not that of the ‘takings’ clause (which required the payment 
of full compensation). However, the Mahon case69 acknowledged that some 
statutes that regulate land use can amount to a taking of land within the U.S. 
Constitution and it seems that the Privy Council has decided appeals from 
Commonwealth Constitutions on similar issues in a similar manner. While 
providing some leeway within which to find that measures short of 
deprivation may entitle an applicant to compensation, it appears that the 
practical results of all these cases may well be rather similar and show a 
tendency on the part of the courts not to overturn the assessment of public 
authorities as to the necessity of certain actions in the public interest, even if 
they impinge to some extent upon private property rights. 
 
The second point to note is the nature of the ‘margin of appreciation’ 
doctrine in the law of the ECHR. Many of the cases discussed above turn on 
the amount of scope given to the Member State by the Strasbourg Court 
under the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. This doctrine is predicated 
upon the idea that a supranational court such as the European Court of 
Human Rights is not best placed to make complex analyses and balances of 
multiple competing interests that are at stake at a national level. Thus, in 
assessing whether or not a Member State has breached the Convention (and 
thus its international law obligations), it may often defer to that State’s own 
assessment of the proper balance to be struck within that State’s own 
territory. However, under the Human Rights Act 1998, our national courts are 
now charged with the responsibility of hearing cases on whether or not public 
bodies in the U.K. have complied with their obligations under the 
Convention. It has been argued70 that the application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine by the national courts would be a far less appropriate 
tool for ensuring the application of Convention Rights in the U.K.: after all, 
                                                 
69 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon (1922) 260 US 393, per Holmes J.. 
70 See, e.g., (Fenwick 2002), pp. 184-185 and the references cited therein. 
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national courts cannot argue so easily that they are unaware of the social 
situation which obtains in their own society. It is thus possible that national 
courts may look less deferentially upon decisions taken by public authorities 
in the U.K. with regard to compensation for interference with property rights 
and may, indeed, require compensation to be made more frequently and to a 
greater extent. However, this argument should be treated with some caution, 
given the record of the Privy Council to date in deciding cases on appeal from 
the various Commonwealth Constitutions in the area of property rights: it 
appears that the Privy Council has taken an approach relatively favourable to 
government interference with property rights in the public interest.71
 
Nevertheless, even by making this argument in favour of 
compensation, the Human Rights angle can often put significant pressure on 
those involved in developing legislation, given the often negative overtones 
of coverage of the issue if the government is seen to be ignoring the very 
Human Rights which it did so much to incorporate within our legal system. 
 
 
2. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] O.J. C364/1 
(18 December 2000) 
 
Article 17 – Right to Property 
 
1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully 
acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the 
public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject 
to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be 




While it should be noted that this Charter was expressly excluded from 
having legal force when it was adopted, it is also important to recognise that 
its position and possible legal status was a key point in discussions in the 
Convention led by Valéry Giscard-D’Estaing on the Future of the European 
Union and was included as Part II of the text of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. It is possible, therefore, that the provisions of the 
Charter may yet become binding European Union law in the relatively near 
future. With that in mind, it is valuable to note the great similarity of Article 
17 of the Charter with the provisions discussed above in the European 
                                                 
71 See (Roberts 2000), pp. 173-176; and see further, generally, (Allen 2000).  
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Convention on Human Rights. Equally, one important difference is the 
Charter’s explicit reference to the need for ‘fair compensation being paid in 
good time for their loss’, with regard to ‘deprivation’ of property. However, 
no such reference is made in relation to the regulation of the ‘use of property’ 
in the third sentence of Article 17. Whether or not this difference is significant 
is difficult to say at this stage, although a number of reasons could be 
suggested for the different wording.72 In the light of the case law of the 
Strasbourg Court discussed above, it is likely that this wording was intended 
to reflect the flexibility of that case law with regard to questions of 
proportionality and compensation, although this is perhaps a somewhat 






















                                                 
72 One possible explanation is the desire to retain the established EC case law concerning the 
‘abusive’ use of intellectual property rights. Article 17(2) of the Charter provides that IP rights 
shall be protected (and, indeed, the current Article 295 EC provides that ‘[t]his Treaty shall in 
no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership’); 
however, the Court of Justice in Luxembourg has developed a doctrine which distinguishes 
between the existence of an IP right and its exercise. Thus, for example, a dominant company 
cannot reply upon national IP rights to act in a manner ‘abusive’ under Article 82 EC (see, 
e.g., Case 102/77 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft 
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH [1978] ECR 1139, at para. 16). If compensation were to be 
required for control of use in the Charter, it is possible that this case law (which, while often 
challenged by various critics, has been an important tool in the opening up of the single 
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